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Dear Mr. Helgason, 
4 March, 1999 
We have just received your FAX requesting our comments on your TOR relating to the 
Rule of Law and Reforming the Judicial System in Nepal. Coincidentally, we are now 
here in Bhutan on a somewhat similar UNDP Mission. (At the moment, we are 
presently writing up our report on a week-long workshop of about 42 judges and 
ministry officials, held under the auspices of the High Court, supplemented this week 
by more in-depth interviews with leading judicial and ministerial officials.) 
Relating to the TOR, we make two initial comments and a suggestion. The two initial 
comments relate to the TOR's substance. The suggestion is that, since we are next door 
in Bhutan, if you thought it desirable, we might easily to stop in Kathmandu for a week 
on our way home to consult on the project, and perhaps even undertake your Step I. 
Our two substantive comments concern the relative weight the TOR gives to reform of 
the judicial system compared to other, complimentary institutional reforms in aid of 
good governance. The TOR sharply defines the difficulties Nepal has encountered in 
ensuring good governance, and the accompanying difficulties in facilitating 
development. Our own experiences elsewhere reinforce the central theme of the TOR: 
Especially as a government moves towards an increasingly market -oriented economy, 
unless it ensures non-arbitrary decision-making -- that is, openness, accountability, 
participation, decision by rule -- in short, the Rule of Law -- effective development 
programs become difficult and then impossible, and corruption comes immediately 
behind. 
Given bad governance and its attendant incoherence and prevalent corruption, the TOR 
suggests a broad-ranging program that we read as having two principal foci: To 
strengthen the judicial system generally, and the criminal justice system in particular as 
a way to stem corruption. Without questioning the urgent need to accomplish those 
two tasks, we suggest that other aspects of the legal order may also need strengthening, 
particularly, the law-creating process. The TOR includes building that process's 
 
 
capacity; our comments refer only to the relative emphasis the TOR accords that 
capacity-building. Here we discuss, first, the relative importance of courts in good 
governance generally and particularly in developing a market economy -- that is, the 
civil side of the court system; and, second, the criminal side with special emphasis on 
the control of corruption. 
I. THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN ENSURING 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 
In our view, the legal order -- by which we mean the entire normative system 
operated by the State, including the rules of law (constitutions, statutes, judicial 
precedents, ministerial regulations, local by-laws, subsidiary legislation, etc.), the 
institutions of law-making (Parliament, Cabinet, ministers who promulgate 
subsidiary legislation and regulations, appellate courts which lay down precedents 
in a common law system, municipal councils, etc.), implementing agencies (courts, 
ministries, departments, Cabinet, the police, district and local governments, etc.) 
and finally ordinary citizens in their roles as addressees of particular laws (when I 
drive an automobile, I become part of the governmental legal order as the addressee 
of the motor vehicle laws). 
The legal order performs many function, of which two predominate: Dispute 
settlement, and behavior-channeling. Courts play a major role in dispute settlement, 
less so, in behavior-channelling. As dispute-settlement agencies, as the TOR states, 
courts help to settle businessmen's disputes over contract, property, the internal 
affairs of corporations, intellectual property, and many others. In every country, 
most businessmen's laws-- that is, property and commercial law generally-- rely on 
individual law-suits for their implementation. For that kind of implementation, 
courts become indispensable. Unless they function, property law, contract law, 
sales law, corporation law, all the laws that form part of the framework within 
which market activities take place, remain unimplemented; businessmen substitute 
crony relationships for market relationships; and, as the current Asian crisis 
demonstrates, all too easily ultimately ends in confusion. 
Markets, however, require a legal framework beyond businessmen's law. Our first 
comment on the TOR suggests that it might pay more attention to the legal 
framework for the institutions that, as it were, form a necessary infrastructure for 
markets. Unless farmers produce goods for sale, no market in agricultural products 
can exist-- no matter how well written the laws of contract and property, no matter 
how well the courts enforce them. For farmers to produce requires many 
government functions in aid of production: Building feeder roads, so they can get 
goods to market; providing agricultural extension services, to improve their 
technology; working with banks to ensure a flow of credit to small farmers; 
providing legal frameworks for marketing cooperatives; and many others. In every 
 
 
sector, a vigorous market economy of course today requires more or less analogous 
laws to these. 
Government initiates, ~des, changes and if necessary abolishes these 
'infrastructural' market institutions through laws, almost invariably, legislation and 
subsidiary legislation. These infrastructurallaws almost never become the subject 
of litigation; they rarely if ever get into court. Because courts are institutionally 
reactive, not proactive, courts almost never interpret or enforce them. To 
implement laws underpinning government programs for feeder roads, agricultural 
extension, agricultural small loans, and marketing cooperatives, not to speak of 
analogous programs in support of small and microenterprises in the informal sector, 
environmental protection, transport and communication, banking, the law of money 
supply, education, health, town planning, public utilities and perhaps nine yards of 
others, government relies not on courts, but ministries, departments, local 
government, and many others. These agencies implement these laws not by 
deciding disputes between individuals or between government and individuals, as 
do the courts, but proactively, in many ways. 
Thus government, by laws directed not only to individuals but to various agencies, 
seeks, not only to provide laws for settling disputes (as it does with businessmen's 
laws), but also to change behaviours among both citizens and officials. That is to 
say, for these essential market infrastructural laws, government enacts laws 
primarily to change and hopefully to improve institutions. 
For the legal order's behaviour-channeling and therefore institution-building function 
, the legislative and administrative functions become all-important. We assume that 
other programs in Nepal look to strengthening the administrative function. We note 
that the TOR mentions as matters of concern legislative drafting and aspects of the 
law-enacting process. Our experience suggests that the success or failure of a law 
whose primary purpose is institution-building depends in the first instance upon the 
bill-creating process -- that is, the process by which somebody's bright idea 
becomes a bill approved by Cabinet. We would urge expanding the sections of the 
TOR focus on building capacity in that bill-creating process as an activity of equal 
dignity with strengthening the courts. The same results obtain in considering the 
TOR;'s emphasis on controlling corruption. 
II. CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 
Of course, strengthening the courts comprises an essential aspect of ensuring the 
Rule of Law; but, in our experience, it remains, while necessary, an insufficient 
requirement. Judges can only make decisions when someone brings cases. Those 
involved in the business of corruption rarely have an incentive to bring a case to the 
court. As with prostitution, neither the buyer nor seller of favors sees any benefit of 
 
 
going to court, far less opening the business to public scrutiny. Furthermore, even 
when corruption cases come to courts, the judges' can only impose punishment. 
The assumption that courts comprise the chief way to combat corruption has led to 
increasingly severe sentences -- up to and including capital punishment -- not 
infrequently with little apparent reduction in corrupt practices. Extensive research 
shows that the severity of punishment seldom deters criminal behavior, least of all 
corruption. Not without reason, given the unlikely possibility of anybody reporting 
the corruption, corrupt officials and those who corrupt them always assume that 
they will get away with it. 
That teaches that while of course efforts must be made to improve and strengthen 
the criminal law and the criminal justice system, these will likely make only a 
marginal impact on corruption. The first wisdom in attacking corruption sugggests 
that of course corruption comes about because of weak people; it also comes about 
because of weak institutions. Using primarily the criminal justice system to attack 
corruption assumes that weak people lie at its heart. Surely at least as important in 
stopping peculation of government funds as the criminal justice system is the 
system of audit and control; good accountants likely can stop more corruption that 
good criminal judges and good criminal law. Statutes that limit discretion and 
require decision-makers to justify their decisions in writing provide a better basis 
for limiting bribery and favoritism than prosecuting the rare official actually caught 
with the hot hand stretched out. Sound government procurement statutes prevent 
corruption before it occurs. In short, sound institutions can make the incidence of 
corruption less likely; punishment only identifies corruption after it has occurred. 
Our experience -- backed by many studies of corruption in developing and 
transitional countries -- suggests the necessity of drafting new laws defensively to 
eliminate or at least reduce government officials' opportunities to engage in corrupt 
practice. That again puts a much greater emphasis than suggested by your TOR on 
strengthening the law-making system to draft and enact effectively implementable 
laws that explicitly limit official discretion by specifying the criteria and procedures 
by which implementing personnel may decide how to behave; and ensuring 
adequate monitoring and evaluating mechanisms to expose corrupt practices 
(including the participation of stakeholders likely to experience their negative 
effects). Various governments have introduced a range of proactive institutions to 
identify corrupt officials, including an ombud; telephone 'headlines;' incentives for 
'whistle-blowers' (like half the fine collected from an official whose corrupt practice 
they expose); etc. 
This would underscore those parts of your TOR that suggest the need for legislative 
drafting training, as well as methods of opening up the law-making process. In our 
experience, that would require that the proposed Mission undertake to scrutinize the 
existing law-making process, from the time someone gets an idea for a policy that 
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seems to require legislation; through the process in which drafters must translate the 
broad policy statement into the detailed legislative measures supposedly designed to 
ensure its effective implementation; through Cabinet and the legislature whose 
members must decide whether, in their country's unique circumstances, the bill's 
details will likely achieve its stated objectives. 
Too often, in the countries where we have worked (including here), that process 
remains insufficiently specified. Seldom does government have any system for 
prioritizing proposed bills on which to spend scarce drafting legislation. Without 
any specified criteria or procedures to guide them, drafters typically neither use 
reason informed by experience to design bills' details in ways required to ensure 
their implementation; nor provide any kind of justification, based on logic and facts, 
which would enable Cabinet members and legislators to assess their likely 
outcomes in the country's specific circumstances. 
The outcome of scrutinizing the existing law-making system, and especially the 
legislative drafting process, would undoubtedly lead to more specific proposals for 
training the relevant actors: ministry officials who must prepare policies for 
legislation; drafters who must translate those policies in bills' detailed measures, and 
justify those details by reason informed by experience; Cabinet members who must 
decide what criteria and procedures to use in prioritizing legislation; and legislators 
who must ultimately decide whether or not to enact the proposed bills, and whose 
responsibilities to their constituents probably should include some form of 
monitoring and evaluation of their implementation and social impact. Presumably, 
if you added this dimension to the TOR, the proposed Mission would need to 
explore all these options, and more. 
Of course courts constitute an extremely important aspect of an adequate legal 
order committed to preserving and enhancing good governance. This letter wholly 
supports the TOR as written; it suggests only that the TOR bring forward the 
requirement that the project also examine carefully and strengthen as necessary the 
bill-creating and law-enacting functions of government. 
As to the suggestion that we might go to Kathmandu for a week before we return to 
Boston: We remain unsure whether you did, in fact, intend us to consider 
undertaking the Mission. We know the UNDP in Pakistan has our CV s, but we do 
not know whether you have received them. 
However, if you do want us to come, we could arrive there by air -- assuming we 
can get on the flight from Paro --Monday, March 8, and work through Saturday, 
March 15 . We would probably have to finalize any report we wrote after our return 
home, and mail it to you by DHL. The advantages in time and money saved seem 
evident, but obviously constraints in terms of availability of the key personnel 
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whom we would have to interview may make this suggestion impractical. If you 
would like us to come, please let us know ASAP so we can try to arrange the 
necessary flight arrangements. 
Sincerely yours, 
~~ 
Abi1 Seidman 
Adjunct Professor, International Development and Social Change, 
Clark University; and Boston University School of Law 
~~ 
Robert B. Seidman, 
Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science 
Boston Un iversity 
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